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The main objectives of this paper are: (i) to establish whether Irish dairy marketing cooperatives
behaved “as if” they were profit maximisers over the period 1961 to 1987 and (ii) to determine the
response of the sector to the imposition of the milk production quota in 1984. The theory of the
cooperative managed firm (CMF) is first recast in a duality framework. The CMF differs from the
profit maximising firm (PMF) in (a) having as its objective the maximisation of the price paid to its
members for the raw material they supply and (b) being obliged to process all the raw material
supplied by its members. A formal test as to whether the Irish dairy-processing sector could be
characterised as “virtual” profit maximisers was implemented and could not be rejected. This
finding was reinforced by our finding that the elasticity of milk price with respect to the volume of
milk processed was zero. Milk price was found to be driven mainly by exogenous changes in the
price of processed output. The impact of the quota was to obviously reduce the level of processed
output but not proportionately. Our results suggest that every 10% fall in the amount of milk
processed reduces processed output of the sector by 6%. We also found a negative relationship
between the amount of the milk raw material processed and the demand for labour implying that
the introduction of the quota would not of itself have adversely affect employment in the sector.




A DUALITY APPROACH TO TESTING THE ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR OF DAIRY-
MARKETING COOPERATIVES: THE CASE OF IRELAND
1. Introduction
Since the introduction of production quotas in 1984 there has been a substantial amount of
analysis of the impact on the choices of primary milk producers in European economies. This trend
has accelerated in the wake of the 1992 "MacSharry CAP Reforms". In contrast with the
voluminous amount of material dealing with primary producers there appears to have been
relatively little analysis of decision-making by the processors of farm output. Yet there are several
important reasons to analyse the behavior of these firms.
For one the processors of milk output are predominantly organised as cooperatives. This raises
interesting issues about the appropriate behavioural framework for the empirical modelling of such
firms. A particular concern in this paper is to explore, in the case of Ireland, whether cooperatives
are fundamentally different in their economic behaviour to profit-maximising firms. Specifically, if
cooperatives are found to be no different in their behaviour to profit-maximising firms it calls into
question the generally favourable fiscal treatment of such entities in most jurisdictions. In Ireland,
for instance, up to April 1992 dairy-processing cooperatives were exempt from corporation tax.
A second major issue of interest arises out of the 1994 reforms themselves. The imposition of the
quota system had a major impact on the dairy-processing sector as Chart 1 demonstrates. Up to
1985
1 milk production in Ireland was growing at a rate of about 5% per year and the intake of
milk for processing would have grown at about the same rate. From this date raw material
available for processing has been more or less fixed. Such an imposition can be expected to have
led to significant adjustment in the output supply and input demands of dairy processors.
                                                       
1 Ireland was exempted from the quota regime in 1984.2
A third notable development in the behaviour of dairy-marketing cooperatives in Ireland at any
rate has been the huge structural change in their organisational structure. Specifically from about
1987 onwards there has a substantial widening in the ownership base of cooperatives through the
public floatation of these entities. A graphic illustration of the sea change which has occurred in
organisation structure is given in Chart 2 where it can be seen that from 1961 to 1986 none of the
total milk supplied was processed by publically-owned entities
2.  This percentage had jumped to
41% by 1987 and a steady growth is evident since then to 1996 where an estimated 52.2% of total
supply is now processed by public companies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate as
to the reasons for the structural change (see, for example, Harte (1994), for a discussion of
possible reasons) but it may not be entirely coincidental that the change coincided with the advent
of production quotas. Dairy-processing firms, facing a profit squeeze as their raw material was
fixed in amount, were forced to diversify and for this capital was needed. The most efficient way
to raise capital was through a public floatation. Farmers on the other hand were prepared to cede
part of their assets on the prospect of compensating for the profit losses likely to flow from the
imposition of quotas.
                                                       
2 Farmers as milk suppliers still retain a majority shareholding in these public companies.
































































The ability of the cooperatives to respond so expeditiously and, on the face of it, so successfully
3,
to the challenges posed by the quota provides prima facie evidence that they were compelled by
the desire to maximise profits or, at the very least, were no less capable of adjusting to changed
circumstances as firms which explicitly conformed to the traditional  profit-maximising paradigm.
Our objectives in this paper are first and foremost to analyse the economic behaviour of dairy-
marketing cooperatives using Ireland as an illustrative case. Specifically we want to explore the
extent to which cooperatives diverge or converge towards the framework of the profit-maximising
firm. Second, we want to establish the economic responses of these firms to changes in exogenous
variables and in particular to the imposition of the milk quota in 1984.
                                                       
3 At present there are three publically-quoted milk processing companies in Ireland: the Kerry Group, the
Avonmore, Waterford Group (AWG) and the Golden Vale Group. Kerry over the coarse of 25 years has evolved
from a regional Irish milk-processing co-operative to one of the world’s leading specialist food ingredients and food
manufacturing businesses. Through an extensive and careful acquisition policy it has gone from a market
capitalisation of IR£50 million in 1986 to a current market capitalisation of IR£1.6 billion. Since the Group’s
listing in 1986 it has had an unbroken record of profit and earnings growth with a current P/E ratio of 24.6.  AWG
was formed in 1997, which emerged from the takeover of Waterford Foods by Avonmore Foods (listed in the late
eighties on their conversion from co-operative friendly societies). The group is the largest cheese producer in
Ireland and the largest cheese processor in the UK. The current P/E ratio is 19.3 and growing. Another company
that was a co-operative for most of its existence is Golden Vale, which was listed in 1990. The market capitalisation
of this company now stands at IR£801.3 million with a P/E ratio of 19.3. This information was taken from DAVY
(1997 and 1998).



























































presume most dairy cooperatives conform to the “open” model
4. This fact makes the CMF quite
different to the closely related labour-managed firm since the latter commonly exists in the
“restricted” form (see Kahana (1989) and Kahana and Nitzan (1989) for a modern theoretical
treatment).
In Helmberger's framework the “open” CMF's objective is not to maximise profits but instead
seeks to maximise the average milk price paid to its supplier members
5. This price is equivalent to
the maximum cooperative surplus (defined as the difference between the value of revenue less all
variable and fixed-input costs) relative to the total amount of milk supplied by its farmer members:
“We may assume that the non-cooperative firm seeks to maximise profit whereas the cooperative
seeks as an “intermediate” objective to maximise cooperative surplus for any given level of M
[level of milk supplies
6]” (Helmberger (1964)).
The Helmberger framework is developed using the tools of classical comparative static analysis.
One of the contributions of this paper is to recast the classical theory of the CMF in a duality
framework. This task results in two important insights. First, it affords a ready comparison
between the theory of the CMF and the PMF and allows clear inferences to be drawn about the
relative economic behaviour of the two forms of organisation
7. Second, the duality approach
provides us with a convenient template for testing the competing CMF and PMF formulations.
Using the language of modern duality theory (see for example Chambers (1988) and Brown and
Christensen (1981)), Helmberger's stated objective for the CMF can be equivalently stated as
seeking to maximise short-run restricted profit where all inputs, bar the raw material milk, is short
                                                       
4 The imposition of the dairy quota system in 1984 means that new members cannot join unless through
inheritance, purchase or lease of quota. However, this development does not transform the cooperative from an
“open” to a “closed” structure since this restriction is policy driven and hence beyond the control of the cooperative.
5 Harte (1992) argues that “… the milk price paid by a cooperative to its members is more like a transfer price
between two related businesses than a market price”.
6 Our italics.
7 In the case of the labour-managed firm the failure to utilise the duality approach has led to serious errors in the
analysis of such forms of organisation (see Kahana (1989)). No such errors appear to have afflicted the analysis of
the CMF. While this may be considered a fortuitously welcome outcome it is nonetheless odd given the virtually
identical forms of organisation in both cases.14
(w2), the volume of milk materials (m) and the level of the capital stock (k). A time trend (t) was
added to the complement of variables in both systems and a simple first-order autocorrelated error
structure was also appended to each equation of the system. With the exception of the trend
variable all variables are normalised to 1987=1. The functional form was assumed to be translog.
The estimator used in both cases was maximum likelihood with cross-equation symmetry
restrictions and price homogeneity imposed
11.
The data are available from 1961 to 1987 and, apart from the milk output variable (m), are
obtained from the Census of Industrial Production compiled by the Central Statistics Office and
maintained in a databank by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin
12. The milk raw
material (m) is got from the Central Statistics Office Irish Agricultural Output table with an
adjustment for farm home consumption. While this aggregate includes milk that is used for both
further processing and final consumption, the vast bulk of farm output is processed and hence it is
felt the variable we use is a very good proxy for the true variable.
Detailed coefficient estimates are given in Table 1. The log-likelihood from estimation of the
system (15)(a)-(15)(d) was estimated as 279.37 and was found to be 286.86 for the system
(15)(a), (b), (c) and (16) and –2*(286.86-279.37) = 15.7 is distributed as a c2 statistic with 6
degrees of freedom. Critical values at the 1%, 2.5% and 5% are respectively 16.8, 14.4 and 12.6
respectively and thus we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the cooperatively-managed dairy
processing sector behaves as a virtual profit maximiser.
                                                                                                                                                                                   
10 An alternative test is proposed by Kulatilaka (1985) which involves testing whether  pmdiffers from pm
v at every
datapoint.
11 The actual computational routine employed was the TSP 4.3 LSQ estimator.
12 From 1961 to 1973 the dairy processing sector is obtained as ISIC category “creamery butter, cheese, condensed
milk, chocolate crumb, ice cream and other edible milk products” and from 1973 to 1987 the sector is given by
NACE code 413 “manufacture of dairy products”.16
Proceeding on this basis we furnish in Table 2 estimates of elasticities for the endogenous variables
calibrated to the 1987 data point.
























































































 t-ratios in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates.
The most interesting results concern the milk price responses. The elasticity of milk price with
respect to milk volume implies a perfectly horizontal demand curve for milk materials. The milk
price is only affected positively by shifts in the exogenously determined processed output price and
while variations in the price of non-milk materials affect the milk price negatively the elasticity is
not statistically significant. This finding is of course consistent with our earlier mentioned result17
that the dairy-processing sector can be modelled “as if” it were behaving as a virtual profit
maximiser. It is also consistent with the finding reported by Higgins (1981) who estimated a cost
function for the sector in the only previous analysis of this type and found that the own-price
elasticity of demand for the milk raw material was not significantly different from zero.
13
The elasticity estimates obtained with respect to the volume of milk materials yield interesting
results. Labour, for instance, is negatively affected by variations in the volume of milk employed as
a raw material so the introduction of the milk quota did not adversely affect its use. Processed
output is observed to fall by 6% for every 10% fall in the level of milk supplied for processing. The
labour-demand elasticity implies that every 10% of an increase in relative wages reduces
employment by about 4%. The elasticity estimates reported for non-milk materials (mainly energy)
are found to be statistically insignificant which may simply reflect their relatively small share of
total costs. The finding that labour and capital are complements is at first glance surprising.
However, the result may point to the limited usefulness of the ceteris paribus assumption in this
case. The cooperative processing sector is driven by the supply of milk supplied to it by its farmer
members. Since labour is seen to be a substitute for the milk input the capital input is possibly
taking up the slack.
5. Concluding remarks
The motivation for this paper was twofold. First, we wanted to establish whether Irish dairy
marketing cooperatives behaved “as if” they were profit maximisers. On the face of it the alacrity
with which many dairy marketing cooperatives diversified their activities in the wake of the
introduction of the dairy quota in 1984 was consistent with profit-maximisation being a strong
behavioural motivation. It would have been impressive if these firms had simply diversified out of
milk processing into related agricultural activities. Not alone did this occur but many firms also
radically altered their ownership structure by becoming Public Limited Companies while still
                                                       
13 The author speculated that the reason for this unexpected result was that dairy-processing did not simply
minimise costs but minimised costs “… subject to paying the maximum price possible for its main raw material -
milk”.18
retaining majority dairy farmer ownership. A second objective of the paper was to examine how
these firms responded to the imposition of the dairy quota by way of their output supply and input
demand decisions.
The traditional theory of the cooperative managed firm (CMF) developed by Helmberger and
others was recast in a duality framework. The CMF firm differs from the profit maximising firm
(PMF) in (a) having as its objective the maximisation of the price paid to its members for the raw
material they supply and (b) being obliged to process all the raw material supplied by its members.
The CMF in practice differs from its close relative - the labour managed firm - in usually having an
“open” rather than a “restricted” membership policy. This means that the only requirement in being
a member of a typical dairy cooperative is that one produces and supplies milk.
The duality framework assisted in clarifying the behavioural objective of the CMF and in particular
in drawing out its relationship with the PMF. In the duality framework the CMF’s objective can be
stated as one of maximising short-run restricted profits, where the main restriction is the amount of
raw material (milk) supplied by its membership which it is obliged to process.  The CMF thus
maximises the product of the milk price and the given amount of raw material processed which is
equivalent to maximising the milk price paid to its membership. Expressed in this way the principal
difference between the CMF and the PMF (assuming price-taking behaviour in input and output
markets) is that in the former case the milk price is the choice variable and the amount of raw
material processed is a given variable while the opposite situation holds for the PMF.
The key to testing the equivalence of the competing behavioural objectives is thus to establish
whether the CMF behaves “as if” it were a PMF, or, in our terminology, is a virtual profit
maximiser.  At the margin the PMF will only demand additional units of the raw material, given its
price, if short-run profits are enhanced whereas at the margin the CMF will only increase the price
it’s prepared to pay for the raw material, given the amount supplied to it for processing, if short-
run profits are increased at the margin. The equivalence between these two approaches was
formally tested for the Irish dairy-processing sector over the period 1961 to 1987 using a
procedure suggested by Conrad and Unger (1987).19
The results suggested that the hypothesis that dairy-marketing cooperatives behaved as virtual
profit maximisers could not be rejected. This raises the interesting question as to why such firms
received highly favourable fiscal treatment for most of the period under review since on the face of
it these firms appear to have operated no differently to the classic PMF. In other words we could
find no strong evidence of externalities in the form of lower profits as a consequence of possible
pressures to pay “excessive” prices for raw materials to their member suppliers.
This finding was reinforced by our finding that the elasticity of milk price with respect to the
volume of milk processed was zero. This result is of course a sufficient condition for CMFs and
PMFs to have identical price responses. Milk price was found to be driven mainly by exogenous
changes in the price of processed output.
The impact of the quota was to obviously reduce the level of processed output but not
proportionately. Our results suggest that every 10% fall in the amount of milk processed reduces
processed output of the sector by 6%. We also found a negative relationship between the amount
of the milk raw material processed and the demand for labour implying that the introduction of the
quota would not of itself have adversely affect employment in the sector.20
REFERENCES
BROWN, R.S.  AND L.R. CHRISTENSEN (1987), “Estimating Elasticities of Substitution in a
Model of Partial Static Equilibrium: An Application to US Agriculture, 1947 to 1974”, in E.R.
Berndt and B. Fields (Eds.) Modelling and Measuring Natural Resource Substitution, Cambridge
MA: MIT Press.
CHAMBERS R.G. (1988), Applied Production Analysis, Cambridge University Press, (1988).
CONRAD, K. AND R. UNGER (1987), “Ex Post Tests for Short and Long-run Optimisation”,
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 339-358.
DAVY (1997), Market Structures and Company Profile: DAVY Guide to the Irish Equity Market
1997, DAVY Equity Research, Dublin.
DAVY (1998), Irish Share Ratings and Price Records: DAVY Weekly Book, DAVY Equity
Research, 3
rd July, Dublin.
DEATON A. AND J. MUELLBAUER (1980), Economics and Consumer Behaviour,
Cambridge University Press, London.
VARIAN, H.R., (1978), Microeconomic Analysis, 3
rd Edition, Norton.
HARTE, L. N. (1994), “Perspective on the Emergence of the Co-op PLCs in the Irish Dairy
Industry”, Presidential Address, Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society of Ireland,
1994/95.
HARTE, L. N. (1992), “Performance and funding of the Irish Dairy Cooperatives”, Proceedings
of the Agricultural Economics Society of Ireland, 1991/92.
HELMBERGER, P.G. AND J.G. YOUDE (1966), “Marketing Cooperatives in the US:
Membership Policies, Market Power and Antitrust Policy”, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.48,
pp.23-36.
HELMBERGER, P.G. (1964), “Cooperative Enterprise as a Structural Dimension of farm
Markets”, Journal of Farm Economics, Vol.46, pp. 603-617.
HELMBERGER, P.G. AND S. HOOS (1962), “Cooperative Enterprise and Organisation
Theory” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLIV, No.2, pp. 275-290.
HIGGINS, J. (1981), “Factor Demand and factor Substitution in Selected Sectors of the Irish
Food Industry”, The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 253-266.21
KAHANA, N. (1989), “The Duality Approach in the Case of Labour Managed Firms”, Oxford
economic Papers, Vol.41, No.3, pp. 567-572.
KAHANA, N. AND S. NITZAN (1989), “More on Alternative Objectives of Labour Managed
Firms”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.13, No.4, pp. 527-538.
KULATILAKA, N., (1985), “Tests on the Validity of Static Equilibrium Models” Journal of
Econometrics, Vol.28, pp. 253-268.
NEARY J.P. AND K.W.S. ROBERTS (1980), “The Theory of Consumer Behaviour Under
Rationing”, European Economic Review, Vol. 13, pp. 25-42.